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The Runway to Settlement
REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS IN AIRLINE BANKRUPTCIES
INTRODUCTION
In the past few decades, every major U.S. airline has
engaged in some type of restructuring in an attempt to avoid
the termination of its business.1 These airlines have been
relatively successful in keeping their businesses alive through
a combination of responsive business decisions and timely legal
maneuvering.2 One of the airlines’ most effective means for
doing so is acquiring cost-cutting concessions from their labor
forces, which are their greatest source of financial difficulty.3
These concessions can be acquired in a variety of ways such as
bargaining, mediation, and arbitration.4 When these methods
are not successful, some airlines have chosen judicial
intervention as an emergency measure.5
In August of 2006, Northwest Airlines’ request for such
emergency intervention almost backfired when a bankruptcy
1

Highlights of these airlines’ restructuring over the past two decades
include: American Airlines’ purchase of Trans World Airlines (TWA) in 2001, currently
in workout with creditors to return to profitability; Continental Airlines filing
bankruptcy in 1983 and emerging in 1986, filing for bankruptcy in 1990 and emerging
in 1993; United Airlines filing for bankruptcy in 2002 and emerging in 2006; Northwest
Airlines filing for bankruptcy in 2005 and remaining under bankruptcy “protection”;
US Airways failing to sell-out to United Airlines in 2001, filing for bankruptcy in 2002
and remaining under bankruptcy “protection,” merging with America West Airlines in
2005; Delta Air Lines engaging in extensive workouts in 2004 to avoid bankruptcy,
filing for bankruptcy in 2005.
2
Recently, the major airlines have considered mergers as a means to
streamline their operations and remain solvent. See Jeff Bailey & Don Philips, Big
Consolidated Airline, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at C1.
3
The primary concessions that airlines seek from their workforce are
reductions in hourly salaries, increases in employee contributions to pension plans and
changes in working conditions (i.e., more working hours). See, e.g., Jeff Bailey,
Northwest Air Flight Attendants Reject Contract Again, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at
C4; Wage Cuts Approved for Comair Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at C9.
4
These processes are explicitly required by The Railway Labor Act. See
discussion infra Parts II.A.1, III.A.3.
5
This is explicitly permitted by the Bankruptcy Code when an airline is
operating in bankruptcy. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
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court ruling threatened the airline’s ability to acquire these
crucial labor-related concessions.6 Fortunately, upon realizing
the error of the bankruptcy court’s decision in both legal
analysis and public policy, the district court reversed the
bankruptcy court.7 The district court’s decision, as opposed to
that of the bankruptcy court, reflects a proper understanding of
the juxtaposition of bankruptcy law and labor law in the
unique context of the airline industry.
Thanks to that
reversal—which was affirmed by the Second Circuit8—the
airlines will continue to be able to acquire these important
labor-related concessions, which are vital to ensuring that the
public has reliable air transportation.
This Note argues that the Northwest Airlines case
provides the correct framework for limiting the effect of labor
disputes on airline employees, the airline itself, and the
traveling public. Part I provides background information by
briefly describing the nature of the major airline business and
then outlining the primary reasons for these airlines’ financial
troubles. Part II reviews the statutes and facts relevant to the
Northwest Airlines case and summarizes the courts’ opinions in
that case. Next, in order to appreciate the consequences of the
final disposition of that case, Part III analyzes the bargaining
relationship between the airline and the union before the
airline requests emergency court intervention. This bargaining
relationship is critical because it is determinative of each
party’s ability to earn concessions and reach a settlement. This
Note suggests that the bargaining relationship between the
union and the airline prior to judicial intervention produces a
desirable status quo.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the
consequences of the Northwest Airlines decision on that
bargaining relationship and status quo. In doing so, this Note
argues that the Second Circuit’s decision helps maintain that
status quo after emergency court intervention and provides a

6
See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 333 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d,
349 B.R. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468-cv(CON),
2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007). Hereinafter, the collection of court decisions
and underlying facts concerning the labor dispute between Northwest Airlines and the
flight attendants’ unions will be referred to collectively as the “Northwest Airlines”
case.
7
See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___
F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468-cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29,
2007).
8
See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 064468-cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007).
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THE LEGACY CARRIER

The six major U.S. airlines are often referred to as
“legacy carriers.”9 These airlines include American Airlines,
United Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Continental Airlines,
Northwest Airlines, and US Airways.10 The term legacy carrier
is often used in conjunction with and compared to “low-cost
carriers” such as Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways, ATA
Airlines, and Spirit Airlines.11 As the name implies, legacy
carriers have been flying for significantly longer than the lowcost carriers. In addition, the legacy carriers have traditionally
offered “premium services” to its customers such as first- and
business-class service, on-board meals, more convenient
schedules and airport locations, and generous compensation
and pension packages for their employees.12 In the past,
customers were willing to pay a premium in the form of higher
ticket prices for these services.13
Low-cost carriers, on the other hand, are primarily an
invention of the past decade and offer “no-frills” or fewer
premium services than their legacy counterparts.14 In turn, the
low-cost carriers are able to offer their services at a reduced
cost to the customer.15 Within the past decade, a price war has

9
See OFF. OF AVIATION AND INT’L AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
AVIATION ANALYSIS: LEGACY CARRIER REVENUE PREMIUMS, FOURTH QUARTER 2002,
at 1 (2002), available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/domestic-competition/4Q02LegacyCarrierPremiums.pdf [hereinafter DOT ANALYSIS].
10
See id.
11
See id.
12
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO’S AIRLINE AND AIRPORT
STUDIES: ACI-NA ANNUAL CONFERENCE ECONOMIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 4 (Sept. 25,
2006), available at http://www.aci-na.org/dexa/docs/Aussendorf.pdf [hereinafter GAO
STUDY].
13
See DOT ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 1-2.
14
Id. at 1; see also Lisa Catherine Tulk, Comment, The 1926 Railway Labor
Act and the Modern American Airline Industry: Changes and “CHAOS” Outline the
Need for Revised Legislation, 69 J. AIR L. AND COM. 615, 635 (2004). One must be
careful, however, not to automatically construe “no-frills” service as “low-quality”
service. For example, “the service quality differential between low-fare carriers and
legacy carriers has narrowed as certain low-fare carriers have, to various degrees,
improved their product by flying newer planes, installing premium cabins, initiating or
improving frequent flyer programs, offering improved in-flight amenities such as live
television, offering less restrictive rules for changing tickets, and increasing both the
density and the scope of their networks.” DOT ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 1.
15
DOT ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 1.
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developed between legacy and low-cost carriers that has forced
some of the legacy carriers to reevaluate their business models
and scale back some of their “premium” offerings.16 In addition,
as a result of the competition that the low-cost carriers have
generated, demand for premium services has fallen, and,
consequently, customers are no longer willing to pay the
premium to travel on “name-brand” legacy carriers.17
Low-cost competition is not the only source of the legacy
carriers’ financial difficulties. The prevailing political and
economic climate also affects an airline’s profits.18 Three
decades ago, the Airline Deregulation Act of 197819 forced the
established legacy carriers to cope with low demand that had
resulted from the insurgence of competition in the market.20
After September 11, 2001, geopolitical instability, threats of
terrorist activity, and economic stagnation further reduced
demand for air travel.21 Recent instability in the Middle East
has also reduced the airlines’ profit margin because
exponentially rising fuel costs have caused their operating
expenses to skyrocket.22

16
See id. at 1-2; Tulk, supra note 14, at 635-36. For example, many of the
legacy carriers have reduced their operating costs by scaling back in-flight catering,
particularly on domestic routes. See LUFTHANSA, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (2004),
available at http://konzern.lufthansa.com/en/downloads/presse/downloads/publikationen/
lh_gb_2004.pdf. In addition, a few legacy carriers have mimicked their low-cost
counterparts by eliminating first and business class altogether on some routes. See
United Airlines, Press Release, Ted Unmasked: United Airlines Reveals Look & Feel of
New Low-Fare Service (Nov. 18, 2003), available at http://www.travelnewhorizons.com/
NHTRAVELER/NHTraveler_12-03.htm#TED%20UNMASKED.
17
See DOT ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 1-2.
18
See generally Tulk, supra note 14, at 628-36.
19
Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
20
Tulk, supra note 14, at 629 (“In efforts to reduce operating costs,
workforces were trimmed and, as a result, unemployment in the aviation industry
increased. As time passed and the airline market grew increasingly competitive,
mergers and bankruptcies became fairly commonplace in the industry . . . .”).
21
Id. at 634-35.
22
See Commercial Jet Fuel Supply: Impact and Cost on the U.S. Airline
Industry Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Aviation, 109th Cong. 1, 3 (2006) (memo)
[hereinafter Impact & Cost] (“[T]he Air Transport Association (ATA) expects jet fuel
costs to average $70 per barrel or $1.67 per gallon in 2006—a 90-percent increase from
2001.”). In January 2006, the average price for a gallon of commercial jet fuel was
$1.81 per gallon. Id. This increase is particularly burdensome because “[a]fter labor,
jet fuel is the second largest operating expense for all U.S. airlines, constituting 10 to
25 percent of an airline’s annual operating costs.” Id. As of March 6, 2007, the Wall
Street Journal reported that fuel costs had “eclipsed” labor as the number one expense
for many airlines. Susan Carey, Calculating Costs in the Clouds, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6,
2007, at B1.
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Increased competition, low overall demand for air
travel, and high fuel costs have all forced the legacy carriers to
engage in significant cost-cutting measures in order to remain
solvent.23 The reduction of premium services,24 however, will
only get these legacy carriers so far.25 The legacy carriers
quickly discovered that their only chance of returning to
profitability was to reduce their existing financial obligations.26
Legacy carriers are particularly burdened by the collective
bargaining agreements with their labor unions because these
agreements were negotiated before every dollar had to be
squeezed out of the airline.27 In other words, because fiscal
discipline was not as essential at the time of their formation,
the market permitted these airlines to indulge their employees
in generous compensation, retirement, and pension packages.28
Thus, the legacy carriers need a plan to renegotiate these
collective bargaining agreements to include terms more
favorable to their economic recovery.29 Many of the legacy
carriers have chosen bankruptcy as a means to effectuate that
labor-cost reduction plan.30
II.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES CORP. V. ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT
ATTENDANTS

While Northwest Airlines did not enter bankruptcy
solely to reduce its labor costs, it was certainly a motivating
factor given that labor is its largest operating expense.31 While
under bankruptcy protection, a debtor such as Northwest
Airlines may request court permission to modify its existing
labor contracts when bargaining has not successfully reduced
its labor costs. In August of 2006, Northwest Airlines made
that exact request. To decide whether to grant that request,
23
See Tulk, supra note 14, at 636 (“Many carriers look to concessions from
labor to keep them afloat while they struggle to catch up with the low-cost carriers.”).
24
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
25
See GAO STUDY, supra note 12, at 4 (indicating that legacy carriers have
not lowered their costs enough to remain solvent).
26
See Richard D. Cuhady, The Airlines: Destined to Fail?, 71 J. AIR L. & COM.
3, 11-14 (Winter 2006).
27
Id.
28
See GAO STUDY, supra note 12, at 9 (citing management and labor
decisions as one of the “key factors” causing airline labor problems).
29
See Cuhady, supra note 26, at 11-14.
30
See id. For a list of the legacy carriers that have declared bankruptcy, see
supra note 1.
31
See supra note 22.
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the court considered a number of federal statutes and the
factual circumstances of the bankruptcy case to decide whether
modification was appropriate relief. After the requested relief
was granted, the court had to consult some of those same
statutes to determine what further action the parties could
take in the bargaining process.
A.

The Relevant Statutes

A collective bargaining agreement is simply a type of
executory contract32 “between an employer and a labor union
regulating employment conditions” such as wages and work
The collective bargaining process places mutual
rules.33
obligations on both the employer and the union.34 Various
federal statutes establish and enforce these obligations.
Generally, the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”)35 governs the
mechanics of the collective bargaining process for the railroad
and airline industries.36 In certain situations, Chapter 11 of
the United States Bankruptcy Code alters the typical collective
bargaining process under the RLA and gives a debtor “special
privileges” when it has chosen to operate in bankruptcy.37
Airlines commonly choose to declare bankruptcy as a means of
gaining access to these special privileges.38 Specifically, under
§ 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, an airline may petition the
court to allow it to “reject” (i.e., breach) an existing collective
bargaining agreement and substitute more favorable terms.39
32

An executory contract is “[a] contract that remains wholly unperformed or
for which there remains something still to be done on both sides.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
33
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
34
See Jeffrey D. Berman, Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements
Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 71 VA. L. REV. 983, 986 n.21 (1985) (citing
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982)).
35
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (2000).
36
For virtually all other industries, the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000), governs the collective bargaining process. See In re Northwest
Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371cv(L), 06-4468-cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007) (“[T]he RLA was
passed [before the NLRA]; yet rather than adding additional industries to the RLA’s
framework, Congress created a separate statutory scheme for those industries, the
NLRA, and expressly carved out employers and employees subject to the RLA from its
coverage.”).
37
For example, the debtor has the right to modify—or “reject”—a preexisting
collective bargaining agreement against the wishes of the labor union that is a party to
that agreement. See discussion of 11 U.S.C. § 1113, infra Part II.A.2.
38
See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
39
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000).
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If the court grants this request, it is not surprising that the
union would be perturbed by that result and threaten to strike
to dissuade the airline from taking that action. It is the
legality of that potential strike, and the court’s power to enjoin
it under the Norris-LaGuardia Act (“NLGA”)40 that was the
primary issue in the Northwest Airlines case.41
This issue was one of first impression for any
bankruptcy court.42 To decide whether a strike would be legal
under these circumstances, the bankruptcy court needed to
analyze the requirements of the aforementioned statutes,
which purport to serve multiple functions: First, they dictate
the extent to which and when the federal courts may intervene
in bankruptcy-labor disputes;43 second, they specify the
mechanics of the negotiating and bargaining process between
the airline and the union;44 third, provide the remedies (both
judicial and extra-judicial) that are available to either party if
one party fails to follow its statutory duties, or if both parties
have followed their respective statutory duties and deadlock
remains;45 fourth, they reflect the policy concerns Congress
considered in enacting all three statutes, supposedly with the
expectation that they operate in harmony.46
The reality, however, is that while these statutes (the
RLA, § 1113, and NLGA) standing alone seem to point to an
obvious solution for the court, their mandates are considerably
less clear in the unique situation where they are implicated
simultaneously.
Prior to addressing their simultaneous
application, however, it is helpful to consider the statutes
individually.
1. The Railway Labor Act
Since Congress enacted the RLA in 1926 to govern
collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”),47 the Supreme
40

29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (2000).
Generally, the Norris-La Guardia Act prohibits federal courts from
enjoining strikes in labor disputes. See infra Part II.C.
42
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 333, 335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d
by, 349 B.R. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007).
43
See discussion of the NLGA, infra Part II.A.3.
44
See discussion of the RLA, infra Part II.A.1.
45
See discussion of the RLA, the Bankruptcy Code § 1113, and the NLGA,
infra Parts II.A.1., II.A.2., II.A.3.
46
See id.
47
It was “amended in 1936 to bring the airline industry within the scope of
its coverage.” In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 351. It is undisputed that the
41
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Court has acknowledged that its primary goal is to prevent and
settle strikes in order to avoid interruptions of commerce.48 As
a means of doing so, the RLA’s strategy is to defer strikes for as
long as possible in the hope that the parties will reach a
To accomplish this goal, the RLA imposes
settlement.49
obligations on both parties when either party is attempting to
alter the terms of an existing CBA.50 These obligations are
primarily contained in section 2 and section 6 of the RLA.51
Section 2 is generally regarded as the “heart of the
Railway Labor Act”52 and requires each party to make every
reasonable effort to reach an agreement during the negotiation
and bargaining process.53 While the scope of that obligation is
vague “and has been left to the courts to interpret on a case-bycase basis,”54 section 6 prescribes a detailed scheme of what
must happen when an airline is engaged in a “labor dispute”
with a union.55 This scheme explicitly sets time frames and
notice requirements for bargaining and negotiation and
requires mandatory mediation, voluntary arbitration, “coolingoff” periods, and even has the possibility of a Presidential
Emergency Board.56 While these processes are being exhausted,
section 6 prohibits both parties from taking any “unilateral” or
illegal action that would disturb the status quo created by an
existing CBA.57 In addition, while the parties are engaged in
mediation with the National Mediation Board (“Mediation
Board”),58 the mediation cannot be terminated at the will of

Northwest Airlines case, and any other case involving the renegotiation of a CBA with
airline employees, is governed by the RLA.
48
Id. at 352 (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 451 (1987)).
49
Thomas E. Reinert, Jr., Airline Labor Disruptions: Is the RLA Still
Adequate?, 15 AIR & SPACE L. 4 (2001).
50
See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2000) (stating that the RLA procedures are the
exclusive means to change an existing CBA).
51
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 352-55.
52
Id. at 352 (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1969)).
53
See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1926).
54
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 352 (citing Chicago & N.W. Ry.
Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 577 (1971) [hereinafter Chicago & North
Western]).
55
See 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, 155, 157, 160 (2000), cited in In re Northwest Airlines
Corp., 349 B.R. at 353.
56
Id.
57
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 353 (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v.
Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 302 (1989)).
58
The National Mediation Board (“NMB”)
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either party until an “impasse” has been reached.59 It is only
when the parties have exhausted this “elaborate machinery,”60
and made “every reasonable effort to negotiate a settlement”61
that the parties may strike.62
In sum, the RLA expressly prohibits the airline from
unilaterally amending the terms of a CBA to suit its financial
needs and prohibits the union from threatening to strike to
prevent the airline from doing so. Stated simply, the parties
are forced to bargain and negotiate for a settlement.
2. The Bankruptcy Code
Because the RLA bargaining process can, by design, last
indefinitely, Congress enacted § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code
in 1984 as an emergency remedy for debtors.63 Section 1113 is

established by the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act of 1926, is an
independent agency that performs a central role in facilitating harmonious
labor-management relations within two of the nation’s key transportation
modes—the railroads and airlines. Pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, NMB
programs provide an integrated dispute resolution process to effectively meet
the statutory objective of minimizing work stoppages in the airline and
railroad industries.
NMB
Mission
and
Key
Functions,
available
at
http://www.nmb.gov/
publicinfo/mission.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
59
See 45 U.S.C. § 156 (2000); In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 347 .
60
Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S.
142, 148-49 (1969).
61
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 353 (quoting Consol. Rail Corp.,
491 U.S. at 302).
62
The Supreme Court has characterized the RLA procedural machinery as a
“virtually endless ‘negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation.’”
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 44445 (1987) (quoting Detroit & Toledo, 396 U.S. at 148-49).
63
Congress enacted § 1113 in response to the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). In Bildisco, the Court
resolved the circuit split over the proper standard for allowing a debtor to “reject” a
collective bargaining agreement. Prior to the enactment of § 1113, the federal courts
permitted rejection of collective bargaining agreements under the executory contract
rejection provision of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000)). Michael D. Sousa,
Reconciling the Otherwise Irreconcilable: The Rejection of Collective Bargaining
Agreements under Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 18 LAB. LAW. 453, 464 n.76
(2003). Prior to Bildisco, the various circuit courts required differing levels of necessity
as a prerequisite to rejection. While some courts required that the debtor demonstrate
that the CBA was “onerous and burdensome,” others merely required the debtor to
demonstrate that the decision was based on a valid “business judgment.” See id. at
464; Richard R. Merrick, The Bankruptcy Dynamics of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 301, 338 (1985-86). The Supreme Court in
Bildisco adopted a middle course between the two possible extremes and established a
test that “balanced the equities” of both the debtor and the union to determine whether
rejection was warranted. See Sousa, supra, at 464. Following Bildisco, Congress
responded by passing § 1113, which specifies that a debtor “may assume or reject a
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one of the “protective” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
because it allows the debtor to relieve itself of burdensome
collective bargaining agreements.64 Because this relief is likely
to upset the expectations of the union and its employees, § 1113
allows a debtor to “reject” an existing CBA only with the
bankruptcy court’s permission.65 Section 1113 requires that the
debtor demonstrate, among other things, that the union has no
“good cause” to refuse the debtor’s proposals.66 In addition, the
debtor must show that its proposed modifications are
“necessary” to permit its reorganization and that all affected
parties are treated “fairly and equitably.”67 If these showings
are satisfactory, the court may permit the debtor to “reject”
certain terms of the CBA and substitute new terms that fit the
above criteria.68
Section 1113, however, is not the panacea that it seems.
Since the enactment of § 1113 in 1984, there has been
uncertainty about the consequences of a court-sanctioned
rejection.69 For example, § 1113 does not specify whether the

collective bargaining agreement only in accordance with the provisions of this section.”
Id. at 469 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1113(a)). Section 1113 specifies precise requirements for
rejection that include, among other things, a requirement that the court must “balance
the equities.” See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c).
64
Labor is an airline’s single greatest operating expense. See Impact and
Cost, supra note 22, at 3.
65
See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c).
66
See Sousa, supra note 63, at 469.
An application for the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement will be
approved by the bankruptcy court only if the court finds that 1) prior to the
hearing on the application, the debtor-in-possession made a proposal for
modification of the agreement to the employees’ authorized representative;
2) the authorized representative refused to accept the proposal without good
cause; and 3) the balance of the equities clearly favors the rejection of the
[CBA].
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)).
67
See In re American Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 908-09 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1984) (establishing a framework for considering the various requirements under § 1113).
68
While § 1113 does not specify whether a court must reject a CBA in whole
or in part, the court’s general equity powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105 appear to permit the
court to “reject” whatever part of the CBA is necessary to the carrier’s reorganization.
See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2000).
69
This uncertainty stems in part from the fact that this question has never
been litigated and also due to the apparent contradictions between § 1113, the RLA,
and the NLGA. For example, while the RLA forbids either party from altering the
status quo, the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to change the CBA terms without
the other party’s acquiescence, which appears to be an alteration of the status quo. See
supra text accompanying notes 57, 65; see also In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R.
at 345 (“[S]ome actual and potential conflicts of legislative policies and goals have
arisen from application of two or more of these laws in particular disputes.”); but see
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parties must continue to negotiate (pursuant to the RLA) after
a court-sanctioned rejection. In addition, § 1113 is silent on
whether a court-sanctioned rejection constitutes a “unilateral
action,” signaling an end to the RLA process and giving the
union a legal right to strike despite the fact that the parties
remain in mediation. It is precisely this question that a court
had never been asked to answer before the Northwest Airlines
case.
3. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
If the union does in fact take the position that a CBA
rejection under § 1113 constitutes a unilateral action and a
violation of the RLA status quo, it seems natural that the union
would also take the position that it was now free to take
The express
unilateral action and threaten to strike.70
language of the NLGA appears to support this position.71
Enacted in 1932, the NLGA explicitly removes the federal
courts’ jurisdiction to issue injunctions in “labor disputes.”72 In
other words, if the union threatened to strike in protest of the
court-approved CBA terms, the NLGA appears to render the
court powerless to stop it.73 Despite this seemingly broad
jurisdictional prohibition, the courts have developed exceptions
to the NLGA to allow an injunction in “limited circumstances,
such as to ‘enjoin violations of the specific mandate of another
labor statute.’”74 In other words, if either party’s action
constitutes a violation of the RLA, then the court would have
the power to enjoin that party’s action.75

infra Part II.C.2 (explaining that there is no contradiction and that the statutes can be
reconciled).
70
In Northwest Airlines, the union took exactly that position. See Brief of the
Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA at 16, In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338
(Nos. 05-17930(ALG), 06-1679(ALG)) (“[E]very court that has addressed the issue has
concluded that an § 1113 contract abrogation precipitates a union’s right to strike.”).
71
See 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“No court of the United States . . . shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a
case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the
provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter.”).
72
Id.
73
The NLGA “lists specific acts that may not be enjoined, including those
involving ‘ceasing or refusing to perform any work.’” In re Northwest Airlines Corp.,
349 B.R. at 355 (citing 29 U.S.C. §104(a) (2000)).
74
Id. (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maint. of Way
Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987)).
75
See id.
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The Northwest Airlines case addresses the legality of
both parties’ actions in an RLA-bankruptcy labor dispute,
which is necessary to determine whether the NLGA’s general
prohibition applies.
B.

Facts of the Northwest Airlines Case

Northwest Airlines (“the airline”) declared bankruptcy
in September 2005 for the first time in its history.76 In October
2005, Northwest sought relief under § 1113, seeking rejection
of its CBAs with six labor unions.77 The airline subsequently
reached consensual agreements on modifications of the CBAs
with five of those unions.78 In March 2006, the airline reached
an agreement (the “March 1 Agreement”) with the sixth union,
the Professional Flight Attendants Association (“PFAA”).79
After a lengthy period of attempted ratification, however, the
flight attendants voted down the agreement by a margin of
eighty percent to twenty percent.80 As a result, the airline
requested that the bankruptcy court rule on its § 1113 motion
vis-à-vis the PFAA CBA.81 The bankruptcy court agreed with
the airline that rejection was warranted and, on July 5, 2006,
ordered the airline to impose terms consistent with the March
1 Agreement on July 17, 2006.82
Following the rejection, the flight attendants voted to
replace the PFAA as their bargaining representative with
another union, the Association of Flight Attendants (“AFA”).83
The AFA quickly commenced bargaining, and “after ten days of
non-stop negotiations,” reached a new agreement with the
76
See Northwest Airlines, Up Close, History, Timeline, Past and Present,
http://www.nwa.com/corpinfo/upclose (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
77
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 335-36.
78
Id. at 336.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. Standard practice is that requesting relief under § 1113 initiates an
intensive negotiation process that usually leads to out-of-court settlement. Thus, the
court may reserve its decision on § 1113 motions until the debtor signals to the court
that its assistance is either necessary or no longer required. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(2)
(2000) (“The court shall rule on [an] application for rejection within thirty days after
the date of the commencement of the hearing. In the interests of justice, the court may
extend such time for such additional period as the [debtor in possession] and the
employee’s representative may agree to.”).
82
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 336-37. The court found that
rejection of the CBA was “necessary” to the airline’s reorganization, the PFAA had no
“good cause” to reject the March 1 Agreement, and the balance of equities clearly
favored rejection. Id.
83
Id. at 337.
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airline on July 17, 2006 (the “July 17 Agreement”).84 While the
new agreement received the support of the AFA leadership, the
employees once again voted down the agreement—this time by
a much narrower margin of fifty-five percent to forty-five
percent.85
In response, pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s § 1113
order, the airline put into effect the new terms consistent with
the March 1 Agreement.86 In response to that imposition, the
AFA gave the airline fifteen days notice of its intention to
strike.87 The AFA made it clear that it intended to implement a
“CHAOS”-type strike.88 Believing that threat, or an ultimate
strike to be illegal, the airline filed a motion with the
bankruptcy court to enjoin the threatened strike activity.89

84
Id. “In light of this new agreement, the airline refrained from imposing
the new terms and conditions of employment that had been authorized by the Court’s
July 5 order.” Id. at 337.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. In addition, the AFA filed a motion seeking an order that the airline be
forced to impose the terms of the July 17 Agreement as opposed to the March 1
Agreement. Id.
88
CHAOS (“Create Havoc Around Our System”) is a course of action
designed by the AFA flight attendants. In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 337.
A CHAOS-type strike consists of

sporadic and relatively brief work stoppages that are designed to create havoc
with an airline’s scheduling of flights and to cause the public to lose
confidence in the ability of the airline to provide reliable service. At the same
time, the program is designed to prevent the airline from attempting to
replace striking workers or take other effective responsive action. [The
bankruptcy court found that] . . . the threat of CHAOS would be likely to
cause the [airline] serious injury, perhaps leading to their liquidation, and
that it would be highly detrimental to the interest of the public in a sound
and reliable transportation system.
Id. The AFA’s general counsel testified that CHAOS is only intended to “put pressure
on management” and to “force an agreement” without putting the company out of
business in the process. Brief of the Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA at 5, In re
Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338 (Nos. 05-17930(ALG), 06-1679(ALG)). The
airline, however, citing statistics provided by the AFA, responded that CHAOS has
previously had the effect of pushing other airlines “to the brink of collapse,” and
causing the airline’s traffic to decrease by twenty to twenty-five percent. Brief of
Appellants and Brief in Support of an Injunction Pending Appeal at 9-10, In re
Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338 (Nos. 05-17930(ALG), 06-1679(ALG)).
89
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 349-50.
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Court Decisions in the Northwest Airlines Case
1. The Bankruptcy Court

When asked to enjoin the AFA from engaging in a strike
following rejection of the CBA, the bankruptcy court refused to
reach the preliminary injunction issue because it found that
the NLGA precluded the court from exercising jurisdiction.90 In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted at the outset that
“[n]othing in the Bankruptcy Code or in the policies of
bankruptcy law overrides the provisions of [the NLGA].”91 As
discussed below, this conclusion was crucial in framing the
court’s analysis of the intersection of relevant statutes.
Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the
bankruptcy court acknowledged that the NLGA does not
universally deprive the courts from enjoining strikes if either
party violates or threatens to violate the provisions of the
RLA.92 Ultimately, however, the court found no reason to take
the case out of the NLGA’s general prohibition because the
court found that neither party had violated the express
provisions of the RLA.93 The court reasoned that the airline’s
decision to seek a rejection remedy under § 1113, while not a
per se violation of the RLA, and certainly within its rights
under federal law,94 terminated the parties’ RLA section 6
negotiation process.95 Thus, while § 1113 technically gave the
airline a right to break the status quo and substitute courtapproved terms, this action consequently freed the employees
to strike at will despite the fact that the Mediation Board had
not released the parties from mediation.96 Therefore, the court
did not accept the airline’s argument that following § 1113
rejection, both parties remained bound by the procedural
90
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 333, 344 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d
by, 349 B.R. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007).
91
Id. at 338.
92
Id. at 339-40 (citing Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maint.
of Way Employees, 418 U.S. 429 (1987); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp.
Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971)).
93
See id. at 343-44 (explaining that a violation of the RLA would have
occurred if the union had either put the “CHAOS program in effect prior to the
[d]ebtors’ imposition of new terms and conditions of employment” or if the union had
refused to bargain in good faith prior to being released from mediation).
94
Id. at 344.
95
Id. at 343 (“There is . . . nothing in § 1113 that suggests that rejection
should trigger an implied obligation on the part of the parties to continue to bargain.”).
96
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 344.
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requirements of the RLA to continue to bargain in good faith
and make every reasonable effort to reach an agreement.97 Put
simply, the court held that the airline could not have it both
ways—the airline had the option to stick it out and continue its
RLA negotiations, or it could take a chance with rejection and
hope the union would acquiesce.98 The airline could not force
the union to accept new terms while simultaneously forcing the
union to sit down and bargain all over again.99
In short, the bankruptcy court’s conclusion rested on a
single premise: because no RLA violation had taken place, the
NLGA’s “default rule” applied and the court was prohibited
from issuing an injunction in a “labor dispute.”100 The airline
immediately appealed the bankruptcy court’s ruling.101
2. The District Court
The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York convincingly rejected that single premise
advanced by the bankruptcy court—that no RLA violation had
occurred—and reversed.102 The district court opinion consisted
of two parts: a section criticizing the reasoning of the
bankruptcy court and a section harmonizing all four statutes.103
97
The airline argued that it was essentially in the “position of a new
employer without a prior collective bargaining agreement and that they can enforce, by
injunctive relief, the obligation of the employees . . . to bargain in good faith toward the
formulation of an agreement.” Id. at 342.
98
See id. at 343.
99
Id.
100
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
101
Bankruptcy judges’ opinions can be appealed to the district court for the
judicial district on a “clearly erroneous” basis. If either party is dissatisfied with the
district court’s decision, the case may be appealed to the court of appeals. “The Code
also permits any of the circuit courts to adopt a special appellate procedure whereby
the first appeal from a bankruptcy court decision is to a panel of bankruptcy judges,
called Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (“BAP”), and then to the court of appeals.” See
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS, TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 113 (11th ed. 2006) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 158(c)
(2000)). Both parties, however, must consent to appeals to these BAPs.
102
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d,
___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468-cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29,
2007).
103
This includes the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) because cases
governed by the NLRA were cited by the AFA in its brief to the court. See, e.g., Brief of
the Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA at 12, In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338
(Nos. 05-17930(ALG), 06-1679(ALG)) (citing In re Petrusch, 14 B.R. 825 (N.D.N.Y.
1981), an NLRA case, for the proposition that “[t]he well established power of the
reorganization court to issues orders necessary to conserve the power in its custody
must be exercised within the scope of a jurisdiction which is limited by the broad and
explicit language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.”). The district court later criticized the
analogy of Petrusch to the present case. See infra note 114.
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The district court’s criticism of the bankruptcy court was
broken into three subsections.
First, the district court noted that if the bankruptcy
court’s reasoning and conclusion were accepted, it would
deprive the Mediation Board of its vital role in the RLA
Specifically, it would divest the
bargaining process.104
Mediation Board of its statutory mandate to make an objective
determination as a neutral party about when the bargaining
had reached an impasse, and to “release” the parties from
mediation so that they may seek self-help.105 Under the
bankruptcy court’s scheme, if the union itself has the power to
conclude that the airline has taken unilateral action, the union
has essentially usurped the authority of the Mediation Board.
The district court found that Congress intended that the
Mediation Board have the power to keep the parties in
mediation indefinitely.106 This granting of power was explicitly
designed to force the parties to settle in order to prevent
disruptions in air transportation.107
Second, the district court found that if the bankruptcy
court’s reasoning and conclusion were accepted, it would create
a conflict between the RLA and § 1113 that would lead to
inconsistent obligations.108 Most importantly, it would render §
1113 a “suicide weapon” rather than a protective device.109 In
other words, by imposing a penalty on a party for exercising its
statutory and judicially approved right,110 the purposes of both
104

In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 364-66.
Id. Under the RLA, the Mediation Board has tremendous discretion to
prolong the bargaining and negotiation process including the ability to induce
arbitration, to order cooling-off periods, and to inform that President that a “labor
emergency” exists. See 45 U.S.C. § 160.
106
See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 365 (“[a] ‘crucial aspect’ of
the RLA is ‘the power given to the parties and the representative of the public to make
the exhaustion of the Act’s remedies an almost interminable process’” (citing Detroit &
Toledo, 396 U.S. 142, 149 (1969))); see also id. (“[T]he real ‘key’ is the Board’s authority
to hold the parties to a dispute in mediation so they cannot engage in self-help; it is a
‘coercive tool essential to bringing the parties to conciliation.’” (citing Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 930 F.2d 45, 47
(D.C. Cir. 1991))).
107
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 365 (“The [Mediation Board]’s
power to hold a dispute in mediation ‘is the key to the structure that Congress
established for bringing about settlements without industrial strife’” (quoting Local
808, Building Maint., Serv. & R.R. Workers v. Nat’l Mediation Board., 888 F.2d 1428,
1432 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
108
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 366-70.
109
Id. at 370.
110
Id. at 367 (“[I]n this case, Northwest acted lawfully, with express statutory
and judicial authorization in altering the status quo pursuant to § 1113.”).
105
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the RLA and § 1113 would be defeated.111 In addition,
permitting a strike following a § 1113 rejection would
completely undermine the bankruptcy judge’s § 1113 findings:
that rejection was “necessary” to the carrier’s reorganization,
that the union did not have “good cause” to reject the carrier’s
prior proposals leading up to the § 1113 motion, and that “the
equities clearly favored rejection.”112
Third, the district court concluded that the bankruptcy
court’s reasoning “does not sufficiently take into account the
fundamental policy concerns and purposes of the RLA.”113
Consistent with this conclusion, the court rejected most of the
bankruptcy court’s (and the union’s) reliance on National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”) cases for the proposition that § 1113
rejection triggered the right to strike.114 The court cautioned
that cross-reliance between RLA and NLRA cases must be done
with care because the statutes have two distinct policy
purposes reflecting the industries that they govern.115
Specifically, while “[t]he NLRA expressly protects the right to
strike,”116 the RLA is designed with the express purpose of
preventing strikes.117 Thus, any NLRA cases that stand for the
proposition that § 1113 rejection implies a right to strike are

111
It would “undercut[] the Bankruptcy Code’s purpose of allowing a debtor to
operate, provide services, and attract investments in favor of reorganization.” Id. at
368. It would also ultimately “defeat the purpose of the RLA . . . , which is to avoid
disruption of commerce by insuring that the carrier will continue operations pending
resolution of labor disputes. . . .” Id. at 368-69.
112
Id. at 370 (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c) (2000)).
113
Id. at 364. “The relationship of labor and management in the railroad [and
airline] industr[ies] had developed on a pattern different from other industries. The
fundamental premises and principles of the [RLA] are not the same as those which
form the basis of the [NLRA].” Id. at 371 (quoting Brotherhood of RR Trainmen v.
Chicago River and Indiana RR Co., 353 U.S. 30, 31 n.2 (1957) [hereinafter Chicago
River]).
114
See, e.g., In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 374 (the court held
that In re Petrusch, 14 B.R. 825 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), was “inapt” because it was a case
involving an NLRA employer). In Petrusch, the court held that, under the NLGA, it
could not enjoin employee picket action targeted at the debtor-employer’s business. Id.
The Petrusch court based its refusal on the fact that the bankruptcy laws do not
supercede the NLGA. Id.
115
“[T]he RLA was passed first; yet rather than adding additional industries
to the RLA’s framework, Congress created a separate statutory scheme for those
industries, the NLRA, and expressly carved out employers and employees subject to
the RLA from its coverage.” Id. at 371 (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (3) (2000)).
116
Id. at 371 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163) (2000)).
117
Id. at 372 (“[i]n the context of the railroad and airline industry . . . there is
precisely such an anti-strike policy, embodied in the RLA” (citing Detroit & Toledo v.
United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148, 154 (1969); Burlington R.R. v
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 451 (1987))).
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distinguishable and, at the very least, presumptively
inapposite.118
With respect to harmonizing the statutes, the district
court noted that this case is primarily one of statutory
construction.119 Therefore, it is relevant that both the RLA and
§ 1113 are more specific than the NLGA.120 The Supreme Court
held in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &
Indiana Railroad Co121 that the specific provisions of the RLA
take “trump” the NLGA.122 Consistent with that precedent, the
district court concluded that to accommodate both statutes, the
NLGA cannot operate to prohibit a court from enjoining
compliance with the procedural requirements of the RLA.123 As
a result, both parties have a legal obligation, enforceable by
injunction, to comply with Sections 2 and 6 of the RLA.124
For the reasons cited above,125 the district court
concluded that § 1113 rejection does not automatically
terminate Section 6 of the RLA bargaining process as the AFA
argues.126 This is because if the union threatens to strike before
the Mediation Board has declared an impasse, it would
necessarily not be exerting “every reasonable effort” to reach a
settlement under Section 2 of the RLA.127 While the court
acknowledged that “reasonableness” under Section 2 is a
118
“The RLA’s fundamental concern with preventing disruption to the
transportation industry by channeling all major disputes into a drawn-out bargaining
and mediation process, distinguishes it from the NLRA and makes cases decided under
the latter statute distinguishable.” Id. at 373.
119
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 347.
120
The district court acknowledged two fundamental rules of statutory
construction. First, that specific provisions take precedence over general provisions.
See id. at 374, 376. Second, that a “statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific
subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized
spectrum . . . .” Id. at 375 n.23 (quoting In re Petrusch, 14 B.R. 825, 829 (N.D.N.Y.
1981)).
121
353 U.S. 30 (1957).
122
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 374-75 (referring to Chicago
River, 353 U.S. at 42) (“[T]he specific provisions of the Railway Labor Act take
precedence over the more general provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act.”).
123
Id. at 375 (“[I]n order to accommodate both [the NLGA and the RLA], the
NLGA does not divest a court of jurisdiction to enjoin compliance with the RLA’s
specific mandates.”).
124
Id. at 376-77. See Chicago & North Western, 402 U.S. at 577.
125
See supra notes 104, 108, 113 and accompanying text.
126
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 378.
127
Id. at 377. Most importantly, the district court noted that “the [Mediation
Board] is uniquely positioned to assess the new, lawfully authorized status quo that
emerged from the operation of the § 1113 Order. . . .” Id. at 379. While the Mediation
Board might very well declare that an impasse does exist post-§ 1113, it must be given
the opportunity to assess the new situation. Id.
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flexible concept, what is “reasonable” must be considered in
light of Congress’ policy goals in enacting § 1113.128 In this
case, the court held that the threat to strike could hardly be
considered reasonable, given that the bankruptcy court just
concluded that the union had no “good cause” to reject the
airline’s prior proposals.129 To reach the opposite conclusion
and permit the union to strike without exerting every
reasonable effort to reach a settlement would be contrary “to
the express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and to the
Code’s overall effect to a give a [debtor] some flexibility and
breathing space.”130
Therefore, the district court reversed the bankruptcy
court’s decision and remanded the case back to the bankruptcy
court to determine whether, given the jurisdiction to enjoin a
strike, the procedural and substantive requirements were met
for an injunction in this case.131 In reaching this conclusion, the
district court emphasized that after rejection, the airline (like
the union) is still required to continue to negotiate with the
union and attempt to reach a mutually agreeable settlement.132
If, ultimately, an impasse remains post-rejection, and the
Mediation Board has released the parties from mediation, only
then does the union possess a right to strike in accordance with
§ 1113 and the RLA.133 And only at that point will the NLGA
prevent a federal court from enjoining the strike.134
This decision’s consequences on the parties’ negotiations
will be explored in the following two sections. To establish a
baseline, it is necessary to explore the nature of the bargaining
relationship between the parties before the airline has chosen
to reject a collective bargaining agreement.

128
Id. at 378. “By the very existence of § 1113, Congress has given the
rehabilitative goal of § 1113 precedence over labor law in order to permit rejection of
collective bargaining agreements.” Id. at 381.
129
It is noteworthy that the union did not appeal the bankruptcy court’s
decision to allow rejection. Id. at 349.
130
Id. at 381 (citing Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 532 (1984)).
131
Id. at 383-84. A court may grant a preliminary injunction where the
movant has demonstrated that “(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of
success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make
them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of the hardships tipping decidedly
toward the [moving party].” Id. at 383 (citing Long Island R.R. Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists, 874 F.2d 901, 910 (2d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted)).
132
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 382.
133
Id.
134
Id.
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3. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
The Second Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction
issued by the district court.135 In doing so, the court reached
three primary conclusions: 1) that the airline’s rejection under
§ 1113 “abrogated (without breaching)” the existing CBA,
which thereafter “ceased to exist;” 2) that the airline’s
abrogation terminated the RLA status quo created by the prior
CBA, after which the RLA’s status quo provisions “ceased to
apply;” however, 3) at present, the AFA’s proposed strike would
“violate the union’s independent duty under the RLA to ‘exert
every reasonable effort to make . . . an agreement.’”136
First, the court found that the rejection “abrogated the
existing CBA in its entirety and replaced it with the March 1
Agreement.”137 While this holding strictly conflicts with that of
the district court—that the airline simply “replaced certain
terms of the CBA with the more favorable terms of the March 1
Agreement” (which otherwise stayed in force)—the effect is
identical because the Second Circuit found, notwithstanding
that abrogation, that the airline did not breach its
agreement.138 Thus, the Second Circuit held that, pursuant to
the bankruptcy court’s authority, the airline acted properly in
abrogating the existing CBA in favor of new CBA terms
necessary to its reorganization.139
Second, the court found that the effect of the abrogation
is that the RLA’s “explicit” status quo provisions no longer
apply.140 By “explicit” provisions, the court is referring to the
agreement-specific RLA requirements that govern the parties
ability to change “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions . . .

135

See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 064468-cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488, at *12 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007). The Second Circuit
panel affirmed with Judges Walker and Raggi signing the majority opinion and Chief
Judge Jacobs authoring a concurring opinion. While Chief Judge Jacobs clearly agreed
with the disposition of the case, the rationale he used to reach that conclusion more
closely resembled that used by the district court. See generally id. at *12-19.
136
Id. at *6.
137
Id. The court found this to be true because “a carrier’s obligation to comply
with [the] new terms [authorized by the bankruptcy court] cannot be reconciled with
the continued existence of its prior contract.” Id.
138
Id. at *6-7 (“If a carrier that rejected a CBA simultaneously breached that
agreement and violated the RLA, the union would correspondingly be free to seek
damages or strike, results inconsistent with Congress’ intent in passing §1113.”).
139
Id. at *8.
140
Id. at *9.
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as embodied in agreements.”141 For example, pursuant to 45
U.S.C. § 156, airlines and unions must give thirty days notice
Therefore,
of any intended change to existing CBAs.142
assuming that the airline and the union have not come to a
mutual agreement on CBA terms following rejection, there is
no agreement under § 152 and consequently, no status quo to
maintain.143
Third, the court held that notwithstanding the
agreement-specific requirements described above, section 2 of
the RLA also contains an independent duty to “exert every
reasonable effort to ‘make’ agreements.”144 The court found
that this duty—unlike the more specific duties described
above—governs the parties’ conduct even after a CBA has been
terminated or rejected.145
In light of these conclusions, the Second Circuit held
that the AFA had not yet discharged its duty to “exert every
reasonable effort to make an agreement following rejection.”146
Like the district court, the Second Circuit acknowledged that
reasonableness is a flexible concept.147 As a guide, however, the
court noted that the section 2 “reasonable effort” duty does
impose unequal burdens on the airline and the union.148
Specifically, the court held that absent bad faith on the part of
the airline, “a union must come closer to exhausting the dispute
resolution processes of the RLA than the AFA has in this case
in order to satisfy its section 2 . . . duty.”149 In this case, the
court noted three important considerations: 1) the bankruptcy
court’s finding that rejection was “necessary;” 2) the airline’s
continued eagerness to continue negotiations; and 3) that the
Mediation Board had not declared an impasse.150 In light of
those considerations, the court found that the AFA’s proposed
141

In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 2007 WL 926488, at *9 (citing 45 U.S.C. §

152 (2000)).
142

Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 156 (2000)).
Id. at *8 (“The RLA does not contemplate the inauguration of a new status
quo absent the mutual agreement of labor and management.”).
144
Id. at *10 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2000)).
145
Id.
146
Id. at *11-12.
147
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 2007 WL 926488, at *10; see supra text
accompanying note 128.
148
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 2007 WL 926488, at *10.
149
Id.
150
Id. at *11 The court noted that the AFA has not yet sought the assistance
of the Mediation Board; however, it declined to comment on whether the district court
may enjoin the parties to return to the Mediation Board. Id. at *11 n.8.
143
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strike was not justified because it had not made “every
reasonable effort to reach an agreement.”151
III.

THE PRE-REJECTION SITUATION

In order to understand the implications of the
Northwest Airlines case, it is necessary to understand the prerejection situation. This Note argues that the pre-rejection
situation is a desirable status quo where both the airline and
union are able to derive some benefits. Specifically, while the
airline typically possesses enough leverage to extract the
necessary financial concessions from its labor unions, the union
also is able to extract “non-financial” benefits in return for
making those company-saving concessions. This Note suggests
that this type of reciprocity is possible in the pre-rejection
situation because certain elements of the bankruptcy process
and the RLA afford the union a modicum of bargaining
leverage. Given the circumstances of the airline’s bankruptcy,
the benefits that the union receives are both justifiable and
potentially productive. Therefore, this Note suggests that
courts must preserve that pre-rejection bargaining
relationship, and resulting status quo, through a proper
application of the governing statutes.
A.

Leverage in Airline Bankruptcies

“Leverage” plays a distinct and important role in CBAtype cases such as Northwest Airlines. The amount of leverage
that a party possesses is determinative of that party’s ability to
make demands or force the other party to make concessions.152
When one party possesses leverage, it is in a position to extract
concessions from its adversary or insist on favorable
amendments to an existing CBA.153 A party to a labor dispute
can gain leverage in one of two ways: 1) when one party gains a
new ability to pressure the other party into accepting
concessions; 2) or when one party loses an ability to resist
pressures or is somehow prohibited from exercising an
advantage it may have otherwise enjoyed. The next three
151

Id. at *11.
See Scott R. Rosner, The History and Business of Contraction in Major
League Baseball, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 265, 280 (2003).
153
See David L. Gregory, COBRA: Congress Provides Partial Protection
Against Employer Termination of Retiree Health Insurance, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 77,
87 (1987).
152
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subsections explore the factors and mechanisms in an airline
bankruptcy that may allow either the airline or the union to
gain leverage and consequently force the other party to make
concessions.
1. The Market for Airline Labor
Historically, market forces have greatly influenced the
apportionment of leverage between a labor union and airline
management. For example, after deregulation154 in 1978, a
number of new airlines entered the industry and price
competition became fierce.155 At the same time, the price of
aircraft fuel increased three-fold.156 Both low-cost competition
and high fuel prices persist in today’s airline market.157 As a
result of these factors, which are out of the airlines’ control,158
154
Prior to 1978, the airline industry was highly regulated. In a recent article
on airline bankruptcies, one commentator described the effects of deregulation:

Prior to deregulation, the government largely controlled fares, routes, and
other aspects of the airline industry. During that time, if operating costs
increased—due to higher fuel costs, or more expensive labor contracts—
prices, in most instances, were correspondingly raised. Routes were not
added without a demonstrated need for new services. With competition
effectively in check, the pre-deregulation era was described as a “fairly
comfortable operating environment.” Airline bankruptcies prior to 1978 were
“extremely rare.”
Despite the relative certainty of the status quo, airline deregulation was
enacted with an eye toward restoring competition in the industry. Lowering
the barriers to entry would mean more airlines in the marketplace to
challenge existing carriers. Service would be brought to smaller, previously
underserved areas. Carriers could set their own rates, with more efficient
operators gaining ground on lesser competitors. Consumers would also enjoy
lower prices. Deregulation, it was argued, would restore industry profits to
the benefit of all.
Eva M. Dowdell, The Chapter 11 “Shuttle”—Coincidence or Competitive Strategy, 71 J.
AIR LAW & COMM. 669, 671 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
155
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor Relations on the Airlines: The Railway
Labor Act in the Era of Deregulation, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1490 (1989). The new
entrants to the market were typically non-union operations. As a result, their labor
costs were considerably lower than their legacy counterparts. In addition, non-union
carriers were not laden with heavy debt burdens, and “were able to take advantage of
their lower costs to underbid the major unionized carriers for customers. [As a result,]
the unionized carriers were forced to match the discounted fares.” Id.
156
Id. at 1489-90.
157
See supra Part I.
158
New technology is making it possible for the airlines to combat the
exponentially rising cost of fuel and regain some “control” over their operating costs.
Some airlines are installing new aviation software that “redraw[s] the routes planes fly
to get from point A to point B—and saving airlines millions of dollars.” Carey, supra
note 22. This sophisticated new software helps airlines “find the best balance of fuel
usage, flight speed and flight path.” Id. Specifically, the software is designed to
sometimes direct the planes to fly more circuitous international routes in order to avoid
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the management of the legacy carriers are forced to “go to war”
against their unions and seek substantial concessions in wages
and work rules.159
At first glance this proposition seems counterintuitive: if
the airlines are the ones in the financial “pinch,” shouldn’t the
unions be able to exploit that weakness and force the airlines
themselves to make the concessions?
One commentator
addresses this anomaly and argues that the reverse is in fact
true: “airline employees are particularly vulnerable to the
financial difficulties of their employers due to the fact that
historically they have been organized on a company-wide craft
basis rather than on an industrial basis.”160 Therefore, because
the seniority system is airline specific (i.e., there is no industrywide seniority), employees do not have the option of leaving one
airline and “transferring” their seniority to another.161 As a
result, the employees have an incentive to make concessions
because they have a direct stake in the financial health of their
employer. In other words, because the employees’ future is
contingent on the airline’s solvency, the nature of employee
seniority gives an airline significant leverage to extract
concessions from its labor unions.
The primary concessions that an airline will seek are
decreases in wages, increases in work hours and significant
reductions in pension and retirement benefits.162 While it is
indisputable that these financial concessions are disastrous for
the employees who rely on wages to make a living, the union is
not powerless to extract non-financial benefits in return. As
will be discussed below, the bankruptcy process and the RLA
do give the union sufficient leverage to acquire these benefits.
2. Creditor Committee Participation
By virtue of the labor union’s participation on
bankruptcy creditor committees, the airline is forced to alter its
overflying countries who charge what the airline deems to be excessive overflight, or
air usage fees. See id. The software then determines whether overflight savings
offsets the cost of flying more miles. Id.
159
Stone, supra note 155, at 1490. The airlines “used the threat of
bankruptcy, merger or sale in negotiations to procure concessions. When negotiations
failed, they demonstrated that they were willing to operate during strikes and to hire
permanent replacements to take strikers’ jobs.” Id. at 1491-92.
160
Id. at 1490-91.
161
Id. at 1491.
162
See Jeff Bailey & Nick Bunkley, Northwest and Its Flight Attendants Await
a Strike Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, at C3; see also Delta Adds $719 Million to
Claims of Retired Pilots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2006, at C4.
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behavior in a way that provides the union with distinct
benefits. Before analyzing these benefits, it is important to
understand the vital role that creditor committees play in the
administration of a Chapter 11 reorganization.163 The creditor
committee’s most important role is to oversee the debtor’s
current operations and reorganization plan.164 An important
part of that power is that the creditors, through the creditors’
committee, are given the opportunity to be heard in court when
they feel that their interests might be adversely affected by the
debtor’s actions.165 The result is that every move that a debtor
makes when in Chapter 11 is “subject to bankruptcy court
oversight.”166 In addition, the creditors can also work to
preserve their interests in out-of-court “work-outs” through
direct bargaining between the creditor committees and the
debtor.167
It is only recently, however, that labor unions have been
permitted to participate on “general” creditor committees.168 In

163
The Bankruptcy Code provides for the appointment of creditors’
committees. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000). Committees traditionally consist of
the seven largest trade creditors, bondholders, and indenture trustees, with more than
one committee appointed in certain circumstances. See 11 U.S.C §§ 1102-03 (2000).
The committee’s role is generally to consult and meet with the carrier, monitor and
investigate management, and negotiate a reorganization plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103
(2000); see also Richard M. Seltzer, The Changed Role of Unions in Chapter 11
Bankruptcies, 18 AIR & SPACE LAW. 8 (2003).
164
“Creditor and equity committees can investigate the debtors’ past and
current operations, oversee continuing operations, and negotiate with the debtor
concerning a reorganization plan.” In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. 338, 369
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468-cv(CON), 2007 WL
926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007).
165
See id. at 370; see also In re Western Pacific Airlines, Inc., 219 B.R. 575,
577-78 (D. Colo. 1998) (describing the creditors’ committee role as a “watchdog”
function).
166
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 370. In support, the court cited
the following statutes:

See, e.g., 11 U.S.C § 363(b) (1984) (transactions outside ordinary course of
business require notice and a hearing); 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1984) (court
approval required before assuming or rejecting any executory contract or
unexpired lease of real property); 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(b)-(d) (1984) (permission
required before obtaining certain credit or debt other than in the ordinary
course of business or on a secured or superpriority basis).
Id. at 370.
167
An argument can be made that most of the “real work” in a bankruptcy
takes place out of court. See Seltzer, supra note 163, at 9.
168
In 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that labor unions
have a right to participate on general, unsecured creditor committees. In re Altar
Airlines, Inc., 727 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1984). The court reasoned that because a union, as
a “collective bargaining representative has a ‘right to payment’ of unpaid wages within
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the first Continental Airlines bankruptcy in 1983 and in the
Eastern Airlines bankruptcy of 1989, the labor unions were
relegated to subcommittees and were prohibited from
participating on the general commercial creditors’ committee.169
In the Eastern Airlines case, the general creditors’ committee,
which did not include labor union representatives, chose to
“defer to management’s labor and strategic policies”
immediately after filing for bankruptcy.170 One commentator
argues that in allowing this exclusion, the bankruptcy courts
effectively “sidelined” the labor voice in bankruptcy
reorganization.171 Today, with inclusion as the general rule,172
unions now sit on creditors’ committees as experienced and
well-respected members of the reorganization process.173
By virtue of that participation, the union now possesses
unprecedented bargaining leverage. Specifically, participation
on creditor committees allows the union to be involved in every
facet of the reorganization process—not merely the labor
issues.174 The effect of this is that the airline is forced to deal
with repeat players at every step of the game.175 For example,
the airline must exercise caution in forcing the union to make
unreasonable labor concessions because any unreasonableness
might carry over and be held against the airline when it is
seeking concessions from a creditor over which it does not have

the meaning of [the Bankruptcy Code],” the union should have an equal role in the
reorganization process. Id. at 91.
169
Seltzer, supra note 163, at 8.
170
Id.
171
Id. See In re Ionosphere Corp., 113 B.R. 164, 166-67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990) (while the Air Line Pilot’s Association union moved for the appointment of a
trustee a few days after the filing of the case, and while the court found repeated
instances of the airline’s pre-petition misconduct that would ordinarily justify the
appointment of a trustee, the court chose not to appoint a trustee until 13 months after
the filing date when the motion was made by the general creditors’ committee).
172
The Air Line Pilots Association International (a labor union) was
appointed as the chairman of the creditors’ committees recently in the US Airways and
United Airlines bankruptcies. Seltzer, supra note 163, at 9.
173
Id. “Unions are able to share strategic views, including views on
management or business plans, with other constituencies and forge joint positions
within an organized creditor structure that simply does not exist outside of
bankruptcy.” Id.
174
In 2006, even if Delta Air Line’s management concluded that a merger
with U.S. Airways was the best strategy for reorganization, that action could not be
taken without the consent of the creditors’ committee. See Michael J. de la Merced, US
Airways Expected to Present Merger Offer for Delta This Week, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
2006, at C7.
175
See Seltzer, supra note 163, at 9.
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a leverage advantage.176
In effect, every aspect of the
reorganization process is subject to greater scrutiny and
broader consequences.
This increased scrutiny allows the union to exert
pressure on the airline to make concessions it might not have
to make outside of bankruptcy. One area where this is
particularly felt is in the management of the bankruptcy
For example, in In re Ionosphere Corp.,178 the
estate.177
creditors’ committee threatened, with the court’s implicit
permission, not to support the airline’s further use of escrowed
funds for operating expenses if the airline did not immediately
agree to have a trustee replace the airline’s management.179
Because the creditor committee’s support was so essential to
obtaining that much-needed cash for basic operating expenses,
the airline’s ability to resist the committee’s ultimatum was
compromised.180
The ability to force management to step down181 has the
potential to give the labor union two distinct benefits. First, by
forcing the current management to step down and substitute a
176
Id. at 9 (“Today, when a carrier’s management enters the meeting room of
a creditors’ committee to seek support for a strategic move, they must face the
representatives of the carrier’s employees, who are present as respected, often key,
decision makers for the creditors’ committee.”).
177
See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000) (The “bankruptcy estate” is composed of “all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case”). In Chapter 11, management of the bankruptcy estate includes continuing to
run the debtor’s business.
178
In re Ionosphere Corp. is the name of the Eastern Airlines bankruptcy case.
Because Eastern Airlines wanted to file its petition in the Southern District of New
York (“S.D.N.Y.”), it caused one of its affiliates, Ionosphere Corporation, which
operated the airport lounges and was domiciled in the S.D.N.Y., to file a bankruptcy
petition in the S.D.N.Y. Then, Eastern Airlines was permitted to file in the S.D.N.Y.
even though it was a “foreign” venue. This type of forum shopping is permitted under
the Code through the “affiliate venue” doctrine. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (2000) (“a case
under title 11 may be commenced in the district court for the district . . . in which there
is pending a case under title 11 concerning such person’s affiliate, general partner, or
partnership”).
179
See In re Ionosphere Corp., 113 B.R. 164, 171 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
180
This results in a reduction of bargaining leverage. See supra Part III.A.;
see also MICHAEL A. GERBER, BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 257-58 (2d ed. 2000).
181
See GERBER, supra note 180, at 257-58.

In cases involving larger companies particularly, management is prone to
change on the eve of bankruptcy or soon afterwards. Professors Lopucki and
Whitford demonstrated this in a study that they conducted of 43 large,
publicly held companies that had sought relief in Chapter 11. They found
that in the period beginning eighteen months before filing and ending six
months after confirmation, 91% of the companies experienced a change in
CEO.
Id.
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trustee, it is less likely that the prior management’s poor
business judgments will continue.182 In effect, the union,
through the creditor committee, now possesses the ability to
indirectly influence management decisions.183 Second, forcing
management to step down allows the union to resume RLA
bargaining with the trustee, who is more likely to be neutral
than the airline’s management.184 Thus, the ability to force this
type of concession from the airline demonstrates the
tremendous influence the union now has by virtue of its
participation on these committees.
In sum, the net result of this multilateral involvement is
an increase in good faith and reasonableness on the part of the
airline. While the relationship between the airline as the
debtor and the union as a creditor remains adversarial in many
respects, increased union participation fosters an environment
where compromise is more likely. As will be discussed below,
were the union to gain a surplus of leverage—by acquiring the
right to strike—the compromise-inducing features of this
relationship would be destroyed as the airline would be at the
mercy of the union.
3. The RLA in the Bankruptcy Context
When the “status-quo provisions” of the RLA operate in
conjunction with the Bankruptcy Code, the union possesses
significant bargaining leverage over the airline. The statusquo provisions of the RLA are roughly analogous to the
automatic stay in the Bankruptcy Code.185 This is because both
provisions have the effect of giving the debtor “breathing space”
to sort out its obligations and concentrate on a reorganization
plan.186 Under Section 6 of the RLA, “the parties must bargain
182

See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
See Cooke v. U.S., 796 F. Supp. 1298, 1300-01 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (debtorairline acquiesced to creditors’ committee recommendation that the current CEO be
replaced by an experienced party who had been hired part-time “to assist the faltering
airline with interline agreements and to encourage lenders and investors to put
additional capital into [the airline]”).
184
See In re New Orleans Paddlewheels, Inc., 350 B.R. 667 (Bankr. E.D. La.
2006) (“With a trustee, all interests are assured a neutral party with the best interests
of the creditors at heart.”).
185
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)-(g) (2000) (the automatic stay prohibits
any attempt by a creditor to collect a debt or improve his position without the express
authority of the bankruptcy court).
186
See In re Timbers of Inwood Associates, Ltd., 808 F.2d 363, 367 n.7 (5th
Cir. 1987) (describing the automatic stay as “breathing space” (citing In re American
Mariner Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1984))).
183
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in good faith over the proposed modifications”187 and neither
party is permitted to alter the status quo by unilaterally
changing the existing CBA.188 While in bankruptcy, this
prohibition on unilateral changes is critical because it prohibits
the union from taking any action that would harm the airline’s
current operations.189 Only when a resolution is reached, or
when the Mediation Board has declared an impasse and a
conclusion of the Section 6 bargaining procedures, may the
status quo be disturbed.190 Therefore, like the automatic stay,
the status quo provisions “freeze” any attempt by either party
to force or reach a solution in any manner other than what is
explicitly provided by the RLA.191
At first glance, this appears to give the airline a
leverage advantage. Because the union is prohibited from
striking, it is forced to sit down with airline management and
bargain according to prescribed procedures.
While this
argument may hold outside of bankruptcy, it fails to appreciate
the nature of this “forced” bargaining in bankruptcy. In
bankruptcy, forced bargaining reduces the union’s leverage
over the airline because, unlike a NLRA-governed dispute, the
union is expressly prohibited from applying “immediate
economic pressure” to force the employer to acquiesce to its
demands.192 Thus, while the parties are required to bargain,
they are not required to abide by any specified time
limitations.193
When operating in bankruptcy, time is an airline’s
greatest enemy.194 The reality of the airline business is that
most major airlines are operating at a loss, and employment
costs are a large reason for their insolvency.195 Because the

187
In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 333, 340 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), rev’d
by, 349 B.R. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 06-4371-cv(L), 06-4468cv(CON), 2007 WL 926488 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2007).
188
See Tulk, supra note 14, at 618-19.
189
See id. at 618-19.
190
See id. at 619.
191
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
192
See Reinert, supra note 49, at 4.
193
The RLA does not set a maximum time for bargaining. See supra note 106.
194
See Stone, supra note 155, at 1499.
195
For the fiscal year 2005, the average operating loss for the six legacy
carriers was approximately $513M. See Annual Reports and SEC 10-K Filings for
American Airlines, United Airlines, Delta Air Lines, US Airways, Continental Airlines
and Northwest Airlines, available at http://www.aa.com, http://www.continental.com,
http://www.nwa.com,
http://www.united.com,
http://www.delta.com
and
http://www.usairways.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
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airline has no control over the cost of fuel or passenger
demand, the airlines will seek financial give-backs and
concessions from its creditors and unions as the quickest way
to relieve themselves of burdensome obligations and return to
profitability.196 It is the airline’s immediate need for labor
concessions that gives the union leverage.197 This is because
the “immediate need” is antithetical to the RLA status quo
provisions. While the airline requires quick concessions, the
status quo provisions allow the union to “hold-out” under the
guise of “continued bargaining,” “good faith consideration,” or
“consultation with membership.”198 Other than making a
motion for immediate rejection under § 1113, the airline is
virtually powerless to expedite this process.
Fortunately, this system has a self-checking feature.
That feature is that the union is not foolhardy—it appreciates
the potential consequences for its members if the airline should
fall deeper into debt.199 Therefore, the union is not likely to use
the interminable nature of the status quo to categorically
refuse concessions—it will merely defer acceptance of those
concessions and “hold-out” in order to gain concessions of its
own. Due to the airline’s financial situation, the union
understands that these concessions will likely not come in the
form of financial benefits. However, financial benefits are only
a part of the union’s modus operandi, for unions use CBAs to
provide their employees with less-tangible, “cost-neutral”
benefits.200
196

See Stone, supra note 155, at 1499.
Id. (“With time and the pressure of the status quo on their side, unions
have often negotiated for outcomes that altered the employer’s initial decision or
cushioned its impact on their members.”).
198
Id. (The RLA’s status quo requirement “enables unions to discuss
[management] decisions before they are implemented and to prevent unilateral
employer actions in the interim.”).
199
It is important to remember that the unions must balance the benefits that
its constituents might receive from holding out with the injury that would occur to its
constituents’ careers if extended periods of onerous obligations forced the airline into
liquidation. For example, in 2003 American Airlines was on the verge of bankruptcy
and its parent corporation authorized a bankruptcy filing. It was “only the unions’
agreement to $1.6 in concessions that kept the airline solvent and [out of bankruptcy].
These concessions were undoubtedly more attractive to the labor unions than the
possible aftermath of the airline declaring bankruptcy.” Tulk, supra note 14, at 634.
Perhaps the reason for this fear was because the unions knew that while in
bankruptcy, the airline would have the option of rejection under § 1113 and they would
have no “good cause” to oppose that request.
200
See Berman, supra note 34, at 985-86; see also Telephone Interview with
Karen Mazure, Member, AFA Financial Review Committee for United Airlines Flight
Attendants (Nov. 4, 2006) [hereinafter AFA Interview].
197
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These “cost-neutral” benefits run the gamut of
tangibility. On one end, the union can use the threat of
“holding-out” as a means to affect “strategic level corporate
In addition, unions actively seek greater
decisions.”201
participation in management decisions as means of improving
their members’ prestige and endowing them with a voice in
For example, in the
shaping the future of the company.202
Northwest Airlines case, the flight attendants were successful
in altering the airline’s future hiring plan, which the flights
attendants perceived as troublesome to their job security.203
Furthermore, in exchange for reductions in wages or increases
in work hours, the unions can bargain for representation on the
airline’s board of directors.204 Other options are more financial
in nature and are contingent on the future success of the
company. These options include: bargaining for a plan of
employee ownership, profit-sharing programs, stock options,
and “greater employee involvement in financial planning.”205 In
the Northwest Airlines case, the plan of reorganization being
proposed by Northwest’s management provides that employees
“will own about 20 percent of the airlines through profit
sharing and claims granted in exchange for concessions.”206 In
201
See Stone, supra note 155, at 1499; see also supra note 183 and
accompanying text.
202
In the United Airlines bankruptcy, in exchange for financial concessions,
the flight attendants were able to negotiate and receive “quality-of-life” concessions.
First, they renegotiated the disciplinary policy for employees who were tardy to work in
“no-fault” situations. Second, they rebuffed an attempt by airline management to
remove the stripes from their uniforms, which the flight attendants perceived as an
attempt to degrade the image of the flight attendants vis-à-vis the rest of the flight
crew. AFA Interview, supra note 200.
203
In an earlier proceeding, the flight attendants convinced the management
to drop its proposal to hire foreign flights attendants for some of its trans-pacific
routes. See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 328 n.25. The court found that
this concession showed considerable “flexibility in the allocation of concessions,”
especially since the hiring of these foreign workers would have made “good business
sense.” Id. at 327. The record showed that “[t]he hiring of foreign flight attendants
would not only reduce costs, but it would also allow the [airline] to attract and serve
customers in a segment of their business in which they compete with foreign airlines
that appear to offer better language capabilities.” Id.
204
See Stone, supra note 155, at 1491.
205
Id.
206
Northwest Expects To Be Worth $7 Billion After Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2007, at C7. This proposal is promising considering that in typical bankruptcy
reorganizations, equity holders at the time the company entered bankruptcy often
“lose” their ownership interest when the company emerges from bankruptcy. (Airline
employees often own stock in their employer.) Because equity holders enjoy the lowest
priority of those who must be “paid out” as part of a reorganization plan, equity holders
are often stripped of their ownership interests so that creditors, who have a higher
priority, can be compensated as required by bankruptcy law. When the company
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the recent United Airlines bankruptcy, the flight attendants
bargained for convertible notes and company contributions to
401K retirement plans in exchange for the airline terminating
The Northwest and United cases
their pensions.207
demonstrate the immediacy with which the airlines need to
save money. In those cases, the airlines are willing to confer
significant future financial benefits in order to reduce their
short-term obligations.208
This type of quid pro quo that affords the union greater
participation in the reorganization process is similar to the
negotiations occurring through the union’s participation on
creditor committees.209 Airline management should view this
type of reciprocal bargaining with open eyes because an
agreement to share control and involve unions in long-range
planning is hardly a price to pay for concessions that reduce
the airline’s most burdensome obligation. Therefore, the courts
should seek to perpetuate an environment where these
reciprocal concessions are possible.
B.

The Pre-Rejection Situation as Good Public Policy

While the airline may ultimately be able to earn
financial concessions on its labor-related CBAs, labor unions do
possess enough bargaining leverage in the pre-rejection
situation to extract substantial concessions for their
members.210 As a matter of bankruptcy and labor policy, these
benefits are justified and will tend to facilitate a more efficient
and equitable reorganization.
Specifically, the leverage
apportionment between the union and the airline prior to
rejection establishes a manageable and potentially productive
status quo in two distinct ways.
emerges from bankruptcy, creditors are often compensated by exchanging their debt
claims for newly issued equity (stock) in the company, which effectively eliminates the
previous equity holders’ interests.
207
AFA Interview, supra note 200. The bankruptcy court in the United
Airlines case found that termination of the pensions was necessary in order to keep the
airline functioning. United was released from $3.2 billion in pension obligations
through 2010. In response, “[t]he federal agency that guarantees pensions, the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, . . . assume[d] responsibility for the plans, which cover
about 134,000 people.” Micheline Maynard, United Air Wins Right to Default on its
Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2005, at A1.
208
It is noteworthy that the airline reneged on offers to provide supplemental
insurance and “early-out” terminations—both of these concessions would have required
the airline to sacrifice capital in the short term. AFA Interview, supra note 200.
209
See supra Part III.A.2.
210
See supra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
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First, while the airline is entitled to certain protections
designed to give a debtor a “fresh start,”211 it is well established
that these protections should not come at the complete expense
of the creditors.212 In other words, it is both expected and
typical for the debtor to have to make significant sacrifices in
exchange for the protective features of the bankruptcy code—
particularly § 1113.213 The debtor’s sacrifices can be considered
fair consideration for the opportunity for a second chance.214 In
addition, to put labor disputes in perspective, the reduction of
labor costs is only one of the many important pieces in the
bankruptcy puzzle.215 Neither party (including the court) can
afford to have the labor component of the bankruptcy swallow
up other important considerations or hinder the overall
reorganization process.216 In this way, any internal mechanism,
such as greater union participation, that quickens the
211
See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 123 (Aspen 2006) (By
distinguishing between pre- and post-bankruptcy petition debts, the debtors receive the
first benefit of the fresh start—the “opportunity to put misfortune or irresponsibility
behind them and to begin life anew.”).
212
See Christo v. Yellin, 228 B.R. 48, 53 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999).

If viewed as a balancing of competing interests, bankruptcy laws should serve
both the need of the debtor for economic rehabilitation by debt forgiveness
and a fresh start, . . . [and] the interests of creditors and society that the
absolved debts be free of fraud, and that the debtor’s assets in excess of
exemptible amounts be distributed to the creditors.
Id. (citing Hon. William Houston Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of
Exemption Limitations: The ‘Opt-Out’ as Child of the First and Parent of the Second, 71
AM. BANKR. L.J. 149, 152 (1997) (citation omitted)).
213
These protections include, but are not limited to: the power to reject a
collective bargaining agreement, 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000); the power to reject executory
contracts and unexpired leases, 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000); the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C.
§ 362 (2000); the trustee’s power to avoid unperfected security interests in personal and
real property, 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000); and the trustee’s power to rescind harmful
transactions occurring shortly before filing the bankruptcy petition, 11 U.S.C. § 547
(2000).
214
See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) (explaining that the
“fresh start” has limits and that even “the honest but unfortunate debtor” may not
have the opportunity for a completely “unencumbered new beginning”).
215
In airline bankruptcies, while labor is an important component of the
restructuring process, the airline must negotiate with other important constituencies to
reduce its operating costs and current obligations. See Northwest Airlines, Current
News Releases, Northwest Airlines Files its Plan of Reorganization (Jan. 12, 2007),
available at http://www.nwa.com/corpinfo/newsc/2007/pr020820071739.html (describing
new agreements with airports (terminal and hanger leases), partner airlines, aircraft
manufacturers, and banks).
216
See Richard L. Merrick, The Bankruptcy Dynamics of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 19 J. MARHSALL L. REV. 301, 356 (1986) (“[T]he purpose of bankruptcy
reorganization is debt adjustment and maximizing the equitable distribution of
available assets and future earnings among creditors.”).
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resolution of labor disputes is productive for the overall
bankruptcy restructuring process. The less time that the
parties spend in adversarial legal proceedings or on opposite
sides of the bargaining table, the less likely it is that any
animus will carry over and affect other aspects of the
reorganization.217
Second, when a debtor seeks bankruptcy protection, it is
an indication that the debtor requires assistance. While
market forces may have contributed to the debtor’s insolvency,
it should be assumed the debtor is somewhat responsible for its
financial distress. In fact, the courts recognize a presumption
that the debtor, prior to declaring bankruptcy, made at least
some unwise business decisions leading up to its bankruptcy
filing.218 Therefore, the incorporation of experienced parties
such as the labor unions into the management structure should
In addition, by granting the
be looked upon favorably.219
employees a stake in the future of the company, it gives the
employees an incentive to provide better customer service.
Increased customer satisfaction is critical to putting the airline
on the right track toward profitability, particularly in the
airline industry where reputation can have a significant effect
on demand for an airline’s services.220
The fate of this desirable status quo is contingent upon
other courts’ following the lead of the district court and Second
Circuit in the Northwest Airlines case. The next section will
demonstrate how the district court’s decision establishes a
framework for the preservation of that leverage apportionment
and pre-rejection status quo notwithstanding an airline’s
request for emergency relief under § 1113.

217
This concern is particularly acute because the general creditors committees
are involved in every aspect of the reorganization. See supra Part III.A.2.
218
See In re Ionosphere Corp., 113 B.R. 164, 168 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“The
language of § 1104(a)(1) of the Code represents Congressional recognition that some
degree of mismanagement exists in virtually every insolvency case.”).
219
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
220
See Jo Ann J. Brighton, The Doctrine of Necessity: Is it Really Necessary?,
10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 107, 112-13 (2000) (“The Court discussed that despite the
capital intensive nature of the railroad industry and, to a lesser extent, the airline
industry, retention of skills, organization and reputation for performance must be
considered valuable assets contributing to going concern value in aiding rehabilitation
where that is possible.” (citing In re Gulf Air, Inc., 112 B.R. 152, 153-54
(Bankr.W.D.La. 1989))).
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THE POST-REJECTION SITUATION

In the Northwest Airlines case, the rejection of the CBA
under § 1113 had the potential to destroy the pre-rejection
status quo if the union were permitted to take immediate
strike action. If other courts do not follow the lead established
by the Second Circuit, and alternatively apply the rationale of
the bankruptcy court, the airlines will suddenly be at the
mercy of their employees, for they simply cannot afford to halt
their operations for days, or even weeks.221 On a broader scale,
if the bankruptcy court’s harmonization of the statutes prevails
in other courts nationwide and unions are permitted to strike
immediately after rejection, the status quo will be instantly
altered as the union comes into possession of its strike weapon.
The result will be a reduction of the bilateral concessions and
compromises that make that status quo a productive one.222
This Note suggests that even though the objectives of
both parties might continue to be in conflict following rejection,
the framework established in the Second Circuit increases the
likelihood that the pre-rejection status quo will be maintained
after rejection.
To go one step further and ensure its
maintenance, this Note argues that courts and the Mediation
Board must insist on holding unions—both the AFA in
Northwest Airlines and unions in the future—to the “good faith
obligations” explicitly found in both the Bankruptcy Code and
the RLA.
A.

After Rejection, What’s Next?

The Second Circuit’s decision in Northwest Airlines
requires the parties to return to the RLA-Section 6 bargaining
table.223 Not only must they return, but, pursuant to Section 2
221
When the bankruptcy court granted Northwest’s motion for § 1113 relief, it
found that a strike would have disastrous consequences on the airline, its employees
and its creditors. See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 329 (“[T]he Court has
already found that revisions to the PFAA agreement and the Debtors’ other collective
bargaining agreements are ‘necessary’ to prevent liquidation and preserve value. The
Debtors cannot survive under the present agreements, and liquidation of this service
company would likely cost all employees (including the flight attendants) their jobs and
result in little or no recovery to creditors.”).
222
See e.g., Seltzer supra note 163, at 8 (Through participation on general
creditor committees, “[l]abor unions are now . . . viewed and treated by debtors,
committees, creditors, the courts, and the media as full bankruptcy ‘players,’ and that
shift has been an improvement for the bankruptcy reorganization process.”).
223
See supra note 132 and accompanying text. This proposition assumes that
on remand, the bankruptcy court found that the standard was met for a preliminary
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of the RLA, they must also continue to make “every reasonable
effort” to reach a settlement that is mutually agreeable.224 It is
unrealistic, however, to assume that both parties will return to
the bargaining table in the same place as where they started—
that is to say equally eager to work toward a solution.
For a number of reasons, the union is not likely to be
amenable to further negotiations after the terms it had
originally bargained for and expected were substituted at the
request of the airline.225 First, it is clear after numerous
adversarial legal proceedings that bargaining is insufficient
and that the debtor has no more options. Specifically, by
asking the court for permission to reject a CBA after a failed
bargaining process, the airline has signaled to the court and
the public that the union is unwilling to compromise and that it
has no choice but to invoke to § 1113 as a last resort.226 Second,
the union is faced with the fact that it has been established on
the record that the union has refused to agree to “necessary”
modifications without any “good cause.”227 Therefore, from the
perspective of the public, the Mediation Board, and any
potential arbitrator, there is a presumption of the union’s bad
faith.228 Third, because the union was not willing to make
sufficient concessions in its wages or benefits, it is unlikely that
it now enjoys any of the “new” management responsibilities
that could have resulted from pre-rejection compromises.229 In
other words, the union representatives are likely to feel even
more alienated from the airline’s management than before.
Despite the union’s probable distaste for future
bargaining, the Second Circuit in Northwest Airlines has made
it clear that the union has a continued obligation to do so.230
Therefore, from the union’s perspective, the best that it could
injunction and the union was consequently enjoined from strike activity. See supra
note 131 and accompanying text.
224
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
225
“Collective bargaining agreements . . . and other policies regarding
workplace relations exist in part to clarify the rights and responsibilities of workers
and management and to assure a certain equality of treatment and expectations.”
Peter Robinson, et al., DyADS: Encouraging “Dynamic Adaptive Dispute Systems” in
the Organized Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 339, 361 (2005). This expectancy is
necessarily upset when one party (with the court’s permission) imposes un-bargained
for terms on the other party.
226
See Matter of Walway Co., 69 B.R. 967, 973 n.15 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
227
See supra note 66.
228
This presumption will be applied in Part IV.D infra.
229
See supra notes 202-05.
230
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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hope for is that the resumption of negotiations is a short-lived
formality. Specifically, the union would likely prefer that the
Mediation Board quickly declare an “impasse”—then, after
declining an invitation to enter arbitration,231 the union’s power
to strike would no longer be deferred.232 Because the union
would finally possess its long-anticipated economic weapon, it
would then have the power to force the airline to accept its
terms under duress.233 If the Mediation Board were to quickly
declare an impasse after rejection, the bankruptcy court’s
decision will have effectively prevailed—over Second Circuit’s
decision—to the detriment of the policies of both the
Bankruptcy Code and the RLA.234 If the union were permitted
to strike without having to return to the bargaining table in
good faith, then the union would receive a leverage windfall
that
would
compromise
the
pre-rejection
leverage
apportionment and virtually eliminate the reciprocal benefits
that come with it.235
On the other hand, the airline probably hopes that the
union, following costly and potentially embarrassing § 1113
litigation, would be enticed to compromise or simply accept the
new court-approved terms. In the alternative, the airline
might also hope that the post-rejection negotiation process
continues indefinitely.236 After all, it has already been given
permission to institute terms that are specifically designed to
aid in its reorganization.237 Despite this, the airline must keep

231
The union would not likely elect arbitration because it would introduce
more uncertainty into the process. Specifically, the union would run the risk of the
arbitrator being sympathetic to the public interest involved if a strike occurred. See In
re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 350 (noting that “Northwest carries 130,000
passengers per day, has 1,200 departures per day, is the one carrier for 23 cities in the
country, and provides half all airline services to another 20 cities”).
232
Id. at 382.
233
The bankruptcy court in Northwest Airlines found that if the airline were
to accept the flight attendants’ terms, that modification would not provide the airline
with the necessary savings to avoid liquidation. See supra note 221 and accompanying
text.
234
This is because the bankruptcy court did not believe that the parties were
required to resume RLA bargaining after rejection.
See supra note 99 and
accompanying text. Therefore, if the resumption of bargaining post rejection is merely
a short-lived formality, the union is not really being required to bargain pursuant the
district court’s order.
235
See supra Part III.B.
236
The Mediation Board has the statutory authority under the RLA to compel
indefinite mediation. See supra Part II.A.1.
237
See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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in mind that the substituted terms are merely temporary.238
This is because, per the district court’s and Second Circuit’s
opinions in Northwest Airlines, a labor strike has not been
enjoined ad infinitum.239 On the contrary, the courts have
merely deferred the union’s right to strike to a later date when
the Mediation Board has declared an impasse (i.e., that no
further bargaining would lead to a solution).240 For this reason,
while the airline has won the immediate battle, which was
necessary to save money in the short-term, the union is much
closer to being given the “green light” to strike.241
In sum, the Second Circuit’s decision has resulted in the
following situation: the airline continues to have an incentive
to bargain in good faith with the union to reach a settlement.
In contrast to the pre-rejection situation, this incentive is
fueled not by a pressing need to cut costs (for the court has
already done that), but by a fear that a strike is now more
imminent. On the other hand, the union has an incentive not
to bargain in good faith and to reach impasse as quickly as
possible in order to “earn” the right to strike. Given these
conflicting objectives, it can be said that the district court’s
decision will help to maintain the pre-rejection status quo and
prevent a strike. This is possible because of the “good cause”
requirement found in § 1113(c)(2).
B.

Strict Adherence to the “Good Cause” Requirement of
§ 1113

Under § 1113(c)(2), a court may not approve a rejection
of a CBA unless it finds that the union has refused to accept
the debtor’s proposal without “good cause.”242 This Note argues

238
See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 382 (“[w]here a debtor
succeeds in making a showing under § 1113 that rejection of its collective bargaining
agreements is necessary to reorganization, that modification is essentially temporary;
the debtor can implement the necessary changes [as approved by the court] only until
the parties bargain to a new contract.”).
239
Id.
240
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
241
Id.
242
Section § 1113(c)(2) refers to the debtor’s “proposal,” which is discussed in §
1113(b). Section § 1113(b) states in pertinent part:

(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession or
trustee (hereinafter in this section “trustee” shall include a debtor in
possession), shall—
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that such a finding should automatically trigger a postrejection presumption that the union did not act in good faith
during pre-rejection bargaining.243 This presumption should be
at the forefront of the Mediation Board’s mind while
supervising post-rejection mediation and should be a major
factor in its decision to declare an impasse. Given the union’s
presumptive bad faith prior to rejection, it should not be
permitted to approach the post-rejection bargaining process
with the sole intent of reaching impasse so that it can strike.
In other words, the Mediation Board should be charged with a
duty to ensure that the post-rejection bargaining process is
truly a good faith exercise and is lengthy enough so that the
appropriate concessions can be made.244 While the district
court’s decision “forces” the parties to bargain post-rejection
and explicitly preserves the Mediation Board’s exclusive power,

(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the
employees covered by such agreement, based on the most complete
and reliable information available at the time of such proposal,
which provides for those necessary modifications in the employees
benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the
debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and
equitably; and
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the
employees with such relevant information as is necessary to
evaluate the proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal
provided for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the hearing provided
for in subsection (d)(1), the trustee shall meet, at reasonable times, with the
authorized representative to confer in good faith in attempting to reach
mutually satisfactory modifications of such agreement.
11 U.S.C. § 1113(b) (2000).
243
In other words, if the union had no “good cause” to refuse the airline’s
proposal, and it did so anyway, that refusal must have been based in some “less-thangood” cause such as greed or a desire to punish.
244
Shortly after the enactment of § 1113, Bankruptcy Judge Richard Merrick
hinted at the importance of time in the § 1113 process. See Richard L. Merrick, The
Bankruptcy Dynamics of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
301, 362. Judge Merrick asserted that the “key to the success” of § 1113 rests in the
management’s ability to convince the union that wage and benefit concessions are
required for the “future viability” of the airline and their jobs. Id. at 362. In addition,
Judge Merrick hypothesized that “local situations” will govern the sacrifices that each
party will have to make to ensure the airline’s viability. Id. at 363. As discussed
above, this Note suggests that Judge Merrick’s dual propositions are absolutely correct.
In other words, the only way for this to work—i.e., to afford the airline with the
necessary to time to do this “convincing”—is to allow the parties to return to the prerejection status quo where the Mediation Board has control over whether the union
strikes. In other words, the Mediation Board must anticipate and counter the union’s
objective of hastening the post-rejection bargaining to reach impasse.
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the courts must retain jurisdiction over the case to ensure that
the Mediation Board is zealously exercising its statutory
authority.
C.

What Constitutes Good Cause

The Northwest Airlines case demonstrates why a
presumption of bad faith is a necessary “check” on the union’s
bargaining behavior. In granting Northwest Airlines’ motion
for rejection, the bankruptcy court found that “the record
contains ample evidence that the union did not have good cause
to reject management’s last offer.”245 Specifically, the union
was not able to justify its refusal to accept the airline’s
proposals.246 Despite this conclusion, the bankruptcy court
appeared to backpedal less than two months later when it
authorized the union to strike. In its decision allowing the
union to strike, the bankruptcy court asserted that it “[could]
not be said” that the union refused to bargain in good faith.247
The bankruptcy court based that assertion on the single fact
that once the AFA was certified to replace the PFAA, the union
and the airline engaged in “round-the-clock negotiations” for
ten days to reach an agreement.248 While this observation is
technically correct, its emphasis on procedure caused the court
to miss the substantive point that it had observed in its prior
decision,249 which was that bargaining that fails to address the
needs of reorganization does not constitute good faith.250 The
district court adeptly recognized this backpedaling as an
obfuscation of the Mediation Board’s statutory role in the

245

In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. at 328.
The court found that while the PFAA leadership technically endorsed the
March 1 Agreement, the leadership actually “gave the agreement little support.” See
id. at 328. In addition, the record suggests that the parties agreed on a target amount
of wage concessions. “Once the level of concessions is set, the only remaining question
is how to reach the target and the value of the components. The [airline’s] March 1
Agreement reaches that target . . . [however,] the PFAA . . . failed to submit an
alternative proposal that reaches that target . . . .” See id. at 328.
247
See id. at 343.
248
Id.
249
See the bankruptcy court’s ruling on the debtor’s § 1113 motion supra note
82.
250
An examination of the parties “good faith” must include a procedural and
substantive analysis. See William J. Goldsmith, et al., Tossing the Coin Under Section
1113: Heads or Tails, the Union Wins, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1516, 1542 (1993)
(arguing that in considering a debtor’s motion for rejection under § 1113, the court
must address both the procedural aspects of the bargaining process and the
substantive aspects of the union’s refusal).
246
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bargaining process,251 and the Second Circuit concurred with
that judgment. Had the appellate courts affirmed the decision
of the bankruptcy court, the “no good cause” requirement of
§ 1113 would have been rendered superfluous.252 In other
words, the bankruptcy court, as opposed to the Mediation
Board, would have effectively given itself the authority to
declare an impasse notwithstanding the union’s lack of good
cause. The Bankruptcy Code and the RLA clearly require
greater scrutiny of the union’s bargaining behavior.
D.

Argument for a New Presumption of “Bad Faith”

This Note suggests that this heightened scrutiny can be
obtained through the operation of a presumption of bad faith
following rejection. The presumption should operate in the
following manner: assuming that the bankruptcy court’s
finding of “no good cause” in a § 1113 motion is factually
correct,253 the post-rejection burden of proof should shift to the
union to demonstrate that the factual situation has somehow
changed and that it now has justifiable reasons for refusing to
acquiesce to the court-approved terms.254 In other words, the
Mediation Board should require that the union rebut this
presumption as a pre-requisite to the declaration of an
impasse. This presumption would change the union’s incentive
structure both before and after rejection.
Prior to rejection, if the union knows that it will not
receive a leverage windfall and will be subject to a presumption
of bad faith following the granting of a § 1113 motion, the
union is more likely to compromise and avoid the § 1113
litigation altogether.255 Following rejection, the presumption
would also weaken the unions’ incentive to treat the RLA
bargaining as a mere formality or pretext. As opposed to the
251

See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
See Goldsmith, supra note 250, at 1539.
253
In the Northwest Airlines case, there is no reason to believe that the
bankruptcy court’s findings underlying the § 1113 motion were incorrect given that the
Union chose not appeal the granting of that motion. See supra note 129.
254
For example, if the circumstances permitted, the union could argue that a
sudden increase in demand for air travel has increased the airline’s profits and
simultaneously decreased the need for labor concessions.
255
In the Northwest Airlines case, the five unions that reached consensual
agreements with the airline immediately following the filing of the § 1113 motion
demonstrated proper foresight of the consequences of rejection—they appreciated that
their leverage was at its peak during the pre-rejection status quo. See supra note 78
and accompanying text.
252
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pre-rejection situation where time was the enemy of the airline,
in the post-rejection situation, time is an ally (i.e., the airline
benefits from any post-rejection delays). This is because the
airline is realizing financial savings without having to make
non-financial concessions to the union.256 Consequently, the
presumption of bad faith would have the effect of giving the
union an incentive to bargain in good faith following rejection.
While the Second Circuit’s decision made the correct
first step by allowing the Mediation Board to continue to
participate in the process post-rejection, the courts must insist
that the Mediation Board keep the negotiations open until the
union has rebutted the presumption. While courts have
historically been reluctant to review Mediation Board
decisions, this reluctance has been in ordering the Mediation
Board to cease mediation and immediately declare an
impasse.257 On the contrary, this Note suggests that courts
scrutinize all Mediation Board “impasse decisions” in the
RLA/bankruptcy context with the goal of extending the time for
mediation. By allowing the mediation process to continue
indefinitely, the Mediation Board will allow the airline to make
the necessary concessions and quid pro quo that will likely lead
to a settlement.258 Both the RLA and Bankruptcy Code provide
authority for this “extension” of bargaining time.259 Under the
RLA, the Supreme Court has made it clear for decades that the
purpose of the RLA is to preserve the status quo indefinitely so
that a settlement can be reached.260 Under the Bankruptcy
Code, the extension of post-rejection negotiations increases the
likelihood that the airline will make non-financial concessions
that will enhance its reorganization potential and improve its
future operations.261

256
See, e.g., supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text (describing some of the
cost-neutral benefits that the flight attendants can receive in exchange for giving
financial concessions).
257
See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 349 B.R. at 366.
258
See supra note 244.
259
With respect to the RLA, it is universally understood that bargaining can
last indefinitely. See supra note 62. With respect to the § 1113 of the Bankruptcy
Code, courts will often delay imposing new terms after approving a CBA rejection in
order to allow the parties to bargain and reach a mutually acceptable settlement. See
supra note 81.
260
See supra note 106 and accompanying text. To date, Congress has not
challenged that proposition by amending the RLA or limiting its operation through
another statute.
261
See supra Part III.B.
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CONCLUSION
This Note began by suggesting that the disposition of
the Northwest Airlines case increased the likelihood that
airlines can continue to acquire company-saving concessions.
As the district court in Northwest Airlines articulated, and the
Second Circuit affirmed, the acquisition of those concessions is
contingent on the airline-debtor’s unfettered access to § 1113 of
the Bankruptcy Code.262 While § 1113 contains internal
mechanisms and requirements to prevent abuses on the
debtor’s side, § 1113 lacks reciprocal mechanisms to prevent
creditors such as labor unions from unfairly capitalizing on the
debtor’s need for emergency relief.
With that in mind, the Second Circuit’s decision places
the parties in a position where the unions do not receive an
“unearned” windfall of bargaining leverage. Alternatively, the
bankruptcy court’s decision creates an incentive to reach a
settlement without court intervention. By virtue of that
decision, unionized employees can simultaneously increase
their job security and receive significant, non-financial
benefits. At the same time, the unions have a distinct
disincentive to litigate their labor disputes because they are
less likely to earn a strike weapon and more likely to have
unfavorable terms imposed upon them by the court.
Subsequent courts can ensure that this incentive structure
remains intact by following the framework established by the
appellate courts in the Northwest Airlines case. By doing so,
and holding the parties to their statutory obligations following
court intervention, the courts can decrease the frequency and
lessen the effects that labor disputes have on the already
volatile airline industry.
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262

See In re Northwest Airlines, 349 B.R. at 346 (“[It would be] ironic . . . for
the Court to conclude . . . that a debtor’s lawful resort to a Bankruptcy Code provision
meant to keep an insolvent business running while it reorganizes its debts would serve
as the automatic trigger point to end the procedures Congress mandated to govern
amicable settlement of major labor disputes involving carriers, and thereby prompt an
immediate strike that could spell doom by liquidation to that airline.”).
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